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IN THE*SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. TSCHAGGENY and ELLEN 
CHARLENE PRICE TSCHAGGENY, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs • 
UNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES 
CORPORATION and FRED F. 
SAUNDERS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14487 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents accept generally as sufficient THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE as set forth in appellants1 brief with the excep-
tions, however, (1) that respondents claim the "unity of title" 
mentioned therein is not the type of unity of title required as 
a condition precedent to a finding of easement or way of neces-
sity and (2) that the facts do not support appellants1 contention 
that a "public way" existed over respondent Union Pacific Land 
Resources Corporation's property. 
Respondents accept as sufficient the DISPOSITION IN 
THE LOWER COURT as set forth in appellants1 brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A print depicting the property in question is set 
forth below for clarity and convenience in understanding the 
pertinent facts involved. 
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Alleged Easement or Way of 
Necessity Shown •• —-
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Defendant Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation 
acquired title to the 21.167 acres of property described in 
paragraph 2 of plaintiffs1 complaint (Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5) 
by a quitclaim deed dated as of April 1, 1971, from Union 
Pacific Railroad Company [Defendants' Exhibit 8]. 
Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation's predecessor 
in interest, Union Pacific Railroad Company, acquired title to 
said 21.167 acres pursuant to a warranty deed (covering Parcels 
2 and 4) and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5) 
from Charles W. and Ellen B. Price dated May 13, 1967 [Defendants' 
Exhibits 4 and 5, respectively]; a warranty deed (covering Par-
cel 3) and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5) 
from Marvin C. and Rhea S. Zitting and Lorin C. and Sylvia N. 
Zitting dated May 19, 1967; a warranty deed (covering Parcel 5) 
and a quitclaim deed (covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5) from 
Poulter Lamborn Vault Co. 
On May 13, 1967, when Charles W. and Ellen B. Price 
executed the warranty deed covering Parcels 2 and 4 and the 
quitclaim deed covering Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 to Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, Prices also owned Parcel 1. At the time of 
those conveyances, Prices believed that they were conveying 
to the Railroad Company and that they were being compensated 
for said Parcel 1 (Tr. page 207, lines 18-30; page 208, lines 
1-10) . 
-3-
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Union Pacific Railroad Company further perfected its 
title to said 21,167 acres of property by instituting a quiet 
title proceeding covering said property and by securing a 
Decree Quieting Title thereto dated February 5, 1968 [Defen-
dants1 Exhibit 7]. Prices, appellants' predecessors in interest, 
were aware that Union Pacific Railroad Company was instituting 
this quiet title action (Tr, page 202, lines 18-26 because they 
executed an agreement dated April 17, 1967 [Defendants1 Exhibit 
6] wherein they agreed to pay Union Pacific Railroad Company 
for all costs incurred in pursuing said action. 
By a lease dated June 1, 1967, Union Pacific Railroad 
Company leased Parcels 2 and 3 to respondent Fred F. Saunders 
(Tr. page 222, lines 18-19). Approximately one month after 
said lease was executed, respondent Saunders placed a lock on 
the gate at Second Street (Tr. page 223, lines 6-30; page 224, 
line 1). To respondent Saunders knowledge, no one has ever 
traversed the alleged right of way without his permission since 
the lock was installed in July of 1967 (Tr. page 224, lines 13-16). 
Said lease was subsequently assigned from Union Pacific Railroad 
Company to Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation and amended 
effective February 15, 1974, to cover Parcels 2, 3, and 4. 
The easement or way of necessity claimed by appellants 
traverses the track bed of the old Utah-Idaho Railroad Company 
right of way (Tr. page 236, lines 23-25). The trackage on this 
old right of way was removed about 1948 (Tr. page 236, lines 
. -4-
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26-28). Consequently, as pointed out on page 2 of appellants1 
brief: 
. . . [T]he period of time in which 
the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
crossed over the defendants1 land in 
order to reach his [sic] property was 
a little less than the 20-year period 
to establish a prescriptive right. . 
• • . . . • . - . 
As evidenced by a warranty deed dated April 1975 
(Tr. page 17), Charles W. Price and Ellen B. Price gave Parcel 
1 to the appellants in this action (Tr. page 177, lines 11-12). 
Appellants now seek to establish an easement or way of necessity 
between Second Street and Parcel 1 by traversing a path across 
Parcels 2 and 3 as depicted by a dashed line on the print. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT UNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES CORPORATION'S 
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, DID 
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PERFECT ITS TITLE TO THE ENTIRE 21.167-
ACRE PARCEL AND TO EXTINGUISH ANY EASEMENTS AND/OR RIGHTS OF 
WAY AFFECTING THE SAME. 
POINT II 
THE REQUISITE "UNITY OF TITLE" DID NOT EXIST IN 
CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE ON MAY 13, 1967, THE DATE OF 
THE CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM DEED OF THE 
PROPERTY UNDERLYING MERELY A PORTION OF THE ALLEGED EASEMENT 
OR WAY OF NECESSITY. 
-5-
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POINT III 
THE ALLEGED EASEMENT OR WAY OF NECESSITY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE INTENT OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE 
MAY 13, 1967, CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM 
DEED FROM CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE TO UNION PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY. 
POINT IV 
SINCE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESS WAS AND IS AVAILABLE 
TO APPELLANTS' PROPERTY, NO NECESSITY EXISTS FOR AN EASEMENT OR 
WAY OF NECESSITY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT UNION PACIFIC LAND RESOURCES CORPORATION'S 
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST, UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, DID 
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PERFECT ITS TITLE TO THE ENTIRE 21.167-
ACRE PARCEL AND TO EXTINGUISH ANY EASEMENTS AND/OR RIGHTS OF 
WAY AFFECTING THE SAME. 
Respondent Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation's 
predecessor in interest, Union Pacific Railroad Company, secured 
from Prices, appellants' predecessors in interest, a warranty 
deed dated May 13, 1967, conveying title to Parcels 2 and 4 
"subject to existing easements and rights of way of record" 
[Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1]. In this regard, no evidence was adduced 
at trial of any easement or right of way of record (Tr. page 
203, lines 6-21). On May 13, 1967, Union Pacific Railroad Com-
-6-
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pany also secured from Prices a quitclaim deed conveying title, 
without any reservations whatsoever, to Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 
[Defendants1 Exhibit 5}. Consequently, if Prices had owned 
any easement and/or right of way traversing any portion of 
Parcels 2 or 3, the same was extinguished by said title instru-
ments. Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 
(1965); Nix v. Tooele County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P.2d 376 (1941). 
By an Agreement dated April 17, 1967 [Defendants1 
Exhibit 6], Prices, appellants1 predecessors in interest, and 
others agreed to pay the costs of a quiet title lawsuit to be 
instituted by Union Pacific Railroad Company covering the entire 
21.167-acre parcel. Said quiet title action was reduced to a 
Decree Quieting Title dated February 5, 1968 [Defendants' 
Exhibit 7]. Although Mr. Price admitted that he knew the Rail-
road Company was instituting this quiet title action (Tr. page 
202, lines 18-26), Prices made no attempt to preserve or except 
from said Decree any interest they may have owned or claimed 
to have owned in the alleged easement or right of way. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company by securing (1) the 
warranty deed, (2) the quitclaim deed, and (3) the Decree 
Quieting Title exhausted every available expedient either to 
obtain any right, title and/or interest which Prices may have 
owned in any such easement or right of way or to extinguish the 
same. Based upon the foregoing title documentation secured by 
the Railroad Company, it is inconceivable that the appellants 
-7-
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presently have any legal or practical basis whatsoever to 
assert any title or interest to such an easement or right of 
way. 
POINT II 
THE REQUISITE "UNITY OF TITLE" DID NOT EXIST IN 
CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE ON MAY 13, 1967, THE DATE OF 
THE CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM DEED OF THE 
PROPERTY UNDERLYING MERELY A PORTION OF THE ALLEGED EASEMENT 
OR WAY OF NECESSITY. 
Appellants, throughout their brief, point out that 
one of the legal requirements which must be satisfied in order 
to establish a way of necessity is "unity of title followed by 
severance". Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243 at 254, 161 Pac. 1127 
(1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22 at 31, 197 P.2d 117 
(1948); Chournos v. Alkema, 27 Utah 2d 244 at 247, 494 P.2d 950 
(1972). 
In Savage v. Nielsen, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
states at pp. 31-32: 
The theory upon which a way of neces-
sity is based is that all the property is ' 
once owned by a single person. He divides 
it into two tracts and conveys away one 
tract. The physical location of the other 
tract is such that it is not reasonably 
accessible without crossing the tract con-
veyed away. If the grantor retains the 
tract which is thus surrounded, without 
any mention of a way, it is presumed that 
he intended to reserve a right of way to and 
from the tract retained. If he sells the 
tract which is thus surrounded without men-
-8-
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tion of a means of ingress and egress 
it is presumed that he intended to 
create a servient estate in himself to 
the extent of a right of way in favor 
of the other tract of land. The require-
ments for a way of necessity are set out 
in the case of Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 
243, 161 P. 1127, 1132, as follows: 
"(1) Unity of title followed by sever-
ance; 
"(2) That at the time of the severance 
the servitude was apparent, obvious, and 
visible; 
"(3) That the easement is reasonably 
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant 
estate; and 
"(4) It must usually be continuous and 
self-acting, as distinguished from one 
used only from time to time when occasion 
arises." 
See also: Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 
Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264; citing Morris v. 
Blunt, and reaffirming requirement number 
three above, and discussing generally the 
doctrine of easements by implication, and 
reasonable necessity; Smith v. Sanders, 112 
Utah 517, 189 P.2d 701, Fayter v. North, 30 
Utah 156, 83 P. 742, 6 L.R.A., N.S., 410. 
It is apparent then, from an analysis 
of the above requirements, that the doc-
trine had its basis in the theory of a 
grant by reason of the circumstances atten-
dant at the time of the grant. It is incon-
sistent with the adversity contemplated 
in the theory of an easement based upon 
prescription. 
A way of necessity arises from the 
existence of such necessity at the time of 
the dividing of the property. . . . 
[Emphasis added.] 
-9-
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At the time of the conveyances to Union Pacific Rail-
road Company in 1967, the property underlying the alleged ease-
ment or way of necessity was owned in part by Zittings and in 
part by Prices as depicted on the print. In short, there was 
no "unity of title" in the property underlying the alleged 
easement or way of necessity at the time appellants1 predecessors 
in interest (Prices) conveyed Parcel 2 to Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. 
The "unity of title", however, that appellants attempt 
to rely upon is that unity which may or may not have existed 
when the property in question was all purportedly owned by 
Utah-Idaho Central Railroad. The difficulty with this position 
is that appellants during trial never established that any such 
unity of title ever existed in the Utah-Idaho Central Railroad. 
Furthermore, even if unity of title did exist in the Utah-Idaho 
Central Railroad, appellants did not and cannot establish that 
at the time of severance, if any, the claimed servitude was 
apparent, obvious, and visible. This is particularly true since 
the alleged easement "is right on the bed of the old Utah-Idaho 
Central Railroad" (Tr. page 236, lines 23-25), which trackage 
wasn't removed until 1948 (Tr. page 236, lines 26-28) at or 
about the same time Prices1 predecessors in interest acquired 
title to Parcel 2 (see the first sentence of appellants' STATE-
MENT OF FACTS). Consequently, if the trackage overlying the 
alleged easement wasn't removed until or near the date Prices 
-10-
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obtained title thereto, it is impossible for any servitude 
(other than as a railroad right of way) to have been established 
prior to Prices1 acquisition of Parcel 2. In summary, the 
severance of the property, if any, occurred prior to the estab-
lishment of any servitude for any purpose other than as a rail-
road right of way. 
The only point in time when any question of severance 
could be raised by appellants would be the 1967 conveyances 
from Prices to Union Pacific Railroad Company; however, at that 
time, there was no unity of title in the property underlying 
the alleged easement or right of way of necessity. Such property 
was owned in part by Prices and in part by Zittings. Nowhere 
in the record did appellants ever establish any unity of title 
to, or a severance of, that property underlying the entire 
length of the alleged easement or way of necessity. 
In order to establish an easement or way of necessity, 
appellants must also establish that such easement was "continuous 
and self-acting, as distinguished from one used only from time 
to time when occasion arises". Savage v. Nielsen, supra at 
page 31. Since the gate at Second Street was locked in July of 
1967 (Tr. page 223, lines 6-30; page 224, line 1) and since 
respondent Saunders doesn't have any knowledge of anyone gaining 
access through said gate without his permission (Tr. page 224, 
lines 13-16) , the evidence reveals that appellants have not 
traversed the area in question since July of 1967. Consequently, 
-11-
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appellants clearly cannot establish the requisite "continuous 
and self-acting" use. 
POINT III 
THE ALLEGED EASEMENT OR WAY OF NECESSITY IS CONTRARY 
TO THE INTENT OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES AT THE TIME OF THE 
MAY 13, 1967, CONVEYANCES BY WARRANTY DEED AND BY QUITCLAIM 
DEED FROM CHARLES W. AND ELLEN B. PRICE TO UNION PACIFIC RAIL-
ROAD COMPANY. 
One of appellants1 predecessors in interest, Charles 
W. Price, testified that in 1967, when the warranty deed and 
quitclaim deed were executed, he understood and believed that 
Union Pacific Railroad Company had purchased and compensated him 
for Parcel 1 in addition to Parcels 2 and 4 (Tr. page 207, lines 
18-25; page 208, lines 5-10). Furthermore, Mr. Price testified 
that he knew Union Pacific Railroad Company was purchasing his 
property for the purpose of constructing a number of warehouses 
and tracks thereon (Tr. page 204, lines 3-28), which use would 
conflict substantially with any alleged easement or way of 
necessity. Consequently, it is clear that at the time of the 
1967 conveyances, Prices never intended to reserve any ease-
ment and/or right of way. See Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Utah 2d 
46, 354 P.2d 852 (1960), where the Supreme Court quotes with 
approval from the Restatement of Law on Real Property, § 47 6 
at page 49: 
-12-
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An easement created by implication 
arises as an inference of the intention 
of the parties to a conveyance of land. 
The inference is drawn from the circum-
stances under which the conveyance was 
made rather than the language of the 
conveyance. To draw the inference of 
intention from such circumstances, they 
(the circumstances) must be or must be 
assumed to be within the knowledge of 
the parties. The inference drawn repre-
sents an attempt to ascribe an intention 
to parties who had not thought or had 
not bothered to put the intention into 
words, or perhaps more often, to parties 
who actually had formed no intention 
conscious to themselves. [Emphasis added.] 
POINT IV 
SINCE ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ACCESS WAS AND IS AVAILABLE 
TO APPELLANTS' PROPERTY, NO NECESSITY EXISTS FOR AN EASEMENT OR 
WAY OF NECESSITY. 
Respondents introduced into evidence a photograph 
identified as Defendants' Exhibit 2 secured in October of 1966 
(Tr. page 232, lines 26-30; page 233,-lines 1-30) which verifies 
that approximately seven months prior to the conveyances from 
Prices to Union Pacific Railroad Company in May of 1967 an 
alternate means of access existed into appellants' property 
from Second Street in Ogden. That photograph depicts a well-
defined roadway to the east of the 21.167 acres in question 
and an automobile situated in close proximity to appellants' 
south property line. Furthermore, respondent Sanders testified 
that he had traversed at least a portion of this alternate 
roadway several times (Tr. page 225, lines 4-30; page 226, lines 
1-13). 
-13-
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If a landowner has other reasonable means of acquiring 
access to his land, he cannot acquire an implied easement of 
way by necessity, Frazier v. Bobbitt, 526 P.2d 1343 (Colo. 1974). 
Furthermore, the court in Ewan v. Stenberg, 541 P.2d 60 (Mont. 
1975), stated at p. 63: 
The crux of this claim is the question 
of whether the requisite necessity does 
or does not exist. . . . The fact is 
that the plaintiffs do have other ways 
of access to and from Tract B. The 
fact that the other ways involved longer 
distances and more inconvenience is not 
an acceptable basis upon which to grant 
the relief requested. The criterion is 
not one of convenience, but of necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the uncontroverted facts and the applicable 
law involved, it is evident that appellants have no legal title 
or interest whatsoever in or to Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5. If any 
such title or interest was enjoyed by appellants' predecessors 
in interest prior to the 1967 warranty deed and quitclaim deed 
from Charles W. and Ellen B. Price to Union Pacific Railroad 
Company and the 1968 Decree Quieting Title, all such rights 
either merged into Union Pacific Railroad Company's fee simple 
title or were extinguished thereby. 
Appellants never established the requisite "unity of 
title followed by severance" as a condition precedent to estab-
lishing an easement or way of necessity. As Judge Calvin Gould 
stated in his Memorandum Decision dated December 24, 1975, 
following trial of this case: 
-14-
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The fact that•no prescriptive 
right exists makes the question of an 
easement of necessity a moot question. 
This is because an easement of necessity 
is simply an easement implied in law to 
reserve access to a property retained 
by a grantor on the assumption that the 
grantor would not have conveyed without 
reserving a right-of-way. Here there 
was nothing in the nature of a right to 
be reserved. The essential ingredient 
to a way of necessity is that the grantor 
had access to either (1) a public way or 
(2) other property which he owned or had 
rights in. Neither exists in this case. 
Appellants1 allegation of easement or way of neces-
sity is contrary to the intent of the respective parties to 
the warranty deed and quitclaim deed dated May 13, 1967, between 
Charles W. and Ellen B. Price and Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
Furthermore, since alternative means of access was available to 
appellants' property at the time of the 1967 conveyances, no 
necessity existed for an easement or way of necessity as contended 
by appellants. 
Based upon the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
request that the decision of the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Q^^^u^ 
sSTEVm A. GOOfiSELL ' 
x Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
S Union Pacific Land Resources 
Corporation and Fred F. Saunders 
600 Union Pacific Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the JS0 day of May, 1976, 
I served by mailing, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendants-Respondents to LaMar 
Duncan, attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, 706 Phillips 
Petroleum Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
q*.v/>U .^±2±s^ 
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